Network Creation Games are a well-known approach for explaining and analyzing the structure, quality and dynamics of real-world networks like the Internet and other infrastructure networks which evolved via the interaction of selfish agents without a central authority. In these games selfish agents which correspond to nodes in a network strategically buy incident edges to improve their centrality. However, past research on these games has only considered the creation of networks with unit-weight edges. In practice, e.g. when constructing a fiber-optic network, the choice of which nodes to connect and also the induced price for a link crucially depends on the distance between the involved nodes and such settings can be modeled via edge-weighted graphs. We incorporate arbitrary edge weights by generalizing the well-known model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] to edge-weighted host graphs and focus on the geometric setting where the weights are induced by the distances in some metric space. In stark contrast to the state-of-the-art for the unit-weight version, where the Price of Anarchy is conjectured to be constant and where resolving this is a major open problem, we prove a tight non-constant bound on the Price of Anarchy for the metric version and a slightly weaker upper bound for the nonmetric case. Moreover, we analyze the existence of equilibria, the computational hardness and the game dynamics for several natural metrics. The model we propose can be seen as the game-theoretic analogue of a variant of the classical Network Design Problem. Thus, low-cost equilibria of our game correspond to decentralized and stable approximations of the optimum network design.
INTRODUCTION
Designing efficient networks is a core topic in Computer Science and Operations Research and the study of classical combinatorial optimization problems like the Minimum Spanning Tree Problem [26] , the Steiner Tree Problem [29] and the Network Design Problem [24, 31, 38] has a significant impact on these research fields. However, all these problems assume that there is a central authority designing the respective network. In practice, many important infrastructure networks like the physical Internet, the road network and the electricity network are the outcome of a distributed and decentralized design process by many interacting agents. This observation kindled the study of game-theoretic models for network formation by selfish agents. In these models the constructed network is determined by the agents' strategies and the focus is on equilibrium networks, where no agent wants to locally change the network [46] . The core research question for such models is to quantify the loss of social welfare due to the lack of a central designer and due to the agents' selfishness, i.e. comparing the social cost of the worst possible equilibrium network with the social optimum network [35] . Moreover, also the study of the computational hardness of finding the best possible strategy of an agent and the analysis of the convergence properties of the induced sequential processes are key questions in the field.
Currently there are two classes of network formation games: variants of the Network Creation Game (NCG) [22] and Network Design Games (NDG), e.g. [6, 7] . In the former games, the selfish agents build incident edges to a subset of other agents to be as central as possible in the constructed connected network. Hence, agents face a trade-off between costs for building and maintaining edges and the service cost for using the network. Here centrality is measured in the created unweighted network which consists of all edges built by the agents and distances are measured as hopdistances. Moreover, every edge has the same fixed price α > 0 which is paid by the building agent. Hence, NCGs can be understood as games where a complete unweighted network is given as host graph and agents, corresponding to nodes in the host graph, strategically select incident edges in the host graph for the price of α per edge. The constructed network is the sub-network of the host graph which only contains selected edges.
In contrast, in NDGs a given network with weighted edges serves as the host graph and every agent has a pair of terminal nodes in the host graph she wants to connect. For this, agents select a connecting path in the host graph and pay a cost proportional to the length of the path for its usage. If edges are used by several agents then the cost of the edge is split among these agents.
Thus in NCGs the distances between all pairs of nodes is important, whereas in NDGs the focus is on simply connecting the terminal pairs. Moreover, the former assume a complete unweighted host graph, whereas the latter assume a weighted not necessarily complete host graph. Hence, NCGs are suitable to model the formation of social networks or the AS-level graph of the Internet, where using the hop-distance is more natural and where agents want to be central, i.e. close to all other agents. But, since NCGs crucially rely on an unweighted host graph, these models cannot be used to investigate the creation of physical communication networks, where edges, e.g. fiber-optic cables, have lengths. NDGs are well-equipped to model the creation of physical communication networks between given terminal pairs, e.g. a network connecting many clients to a server or access point, where only connectivity matters. However, NDGs are not suited for studying settings where the agents are interested in communicating with all other agents and where agents are restricted to buy only incident edges.
To overcome these shortcomings of NCGs and NDGs, we propose and investigate a model which is a generalization of NCGs but which also shares some aspects with NDGs and therefore allows to model the creation of physical communication networks where the goal is to achieve an efficient communication between all pairs of nodes at low cost. That is, we are interested in the decentralized creation of edge-weighted networks which minimize the pairwise distances between agents and the total cost of all built edges. This can be seen as the game-theoretic analogue of the well-known Network Design Problem [31] , where a weighted network and budgets for buying edges and the total routing cost between all pairs are given and the goal is to select a sub-network which respects both budgets. For this, we consider a variant of the NCG, where the given host graph is an arbitrary weighted graph and the prices for buying and using an edge are proportional to its weight. For example, with this we can model the realistic geometric setting where agents have a position in some metric space and the given weighted host graph uses the distance between the positions of the involved agents as edge weights. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first variant of a NCG with weighted edges.
Model and Notation
We consider a generalization of the well-known Network Creation Game by Fabrikant et al. [22] . In our game, called the Generalized Network Creation Game (GNCG), we consider a given host graph H = (V , E(H )), which is a complete undirected weighted graph on n nodes v 1 , . . . , v n with arbitrary non-negative edge weights w : E (H ) → R + . Since edges are undirected, we will denote any edge {u, v} ∈ E (H ) as (u, v) and we assume (u, v) = (v, u) = {u, v}.
Every node of H corresponds to a selfish agent who wants to participate in the network formation. To achieve this, agents strategically decide which subset of incident edges to buy, i.e. a strategy S u of an agent u is any node subset of V \ {u} towards which agent u wants to create edges. If v ∈ S u , then we call agent u the owner of the undirected edge (u, v) and u has to pay the full edge price 1 .
We assume that the edge price of any edge (u, v) is proportional to its weight w (u, v). In particular, we assume that the edge price for any edge (u, v) is α · w (u, v), where α > 0 is a fixed parameter of the game which allows to model different trade-offs between the cost for buying and for using edges.
Let s = (S v 1 , . . . , S v n ) be any strategy profile, which is any vector of strategies of all n agents. The strategy profile s uniquely determines a subgraph
Let d G (u, v) be the distance between two nodes u and v in the network G, which is equal to the total weight of the shortest path between u and v, or +∞ if such a path does not exist. To simplify the notation we will use
is the distance cost and α · w (u, S u ) is the edge cost of the agent u. By G − (u, v) (or G + (u, v)) we denote a network G where edge (u, v) is removed (is added, respectively).
Given any strategy profile s and its corresponding network G (s), then the cost of agent u in G (s) is defined as
The social cost of network G (s), denoted cost (G (s)) is defined as the sum of the cost of all agents, i.e., cost (G (s)) = u ∈V cost (u, G (s)).
For any host graph H , we say that the social optimum subgraph OPT of H is the network G (s * ) = (V , E (s * )) which minimizes cost (G (s * )) among all possible strategy profiles. Thus, OPT mini-
We say that a strategy change from S u to S ′ u is an improving move for agent u, if cost (u, G (s)) < cost (u, G (s ′ )), where s ′ is identical to s except for agent u's strategy, which is S ′ u instead of S u . If there is no improving move for agent u with strategy S u in s, then we say that S u is agent u's best response. Any strategy change towards a best response strategy is called a best response move. A sequence of best response moves which starts and ends with the same strategy vector is called a best response cycle. If any sequence of improving moves is finite, then the game has the finite improvement property (FIP) which is equivalent to the game being a potential game [44] . The existence of a best response cycle therefore proves that the FIP is violated and thus that the game is not a potential game.
We say that a network G (s) is in pure Nash Equilibrium (NE), if no agent in G (s) has an improving move. A network G (s) is in Greedy Equilibrium (GE) [37] if no agent can improve by buying, swapping or deleting a single edge, where a swap is the combination of deleting an incident edge and buying another one. Moreover, G (s) is in Add-only Equilibrium (AE), if no agent can improve by buying a single incident edge. It directly follows that any network in NE is 1 If v ∈ S u and u ∈ S v then both agents have to pay the full edge price. However, in this case one of the agents could improve on her current situation in the network by not buying the edge (u, v ), which implies that in any equilibrium or in the social optimum network every edge has exactly one owner. also in GE and any network in GE is also in AE. Additionally, we say that G (s) is in β-approximate NE (β-NE) if no agent u can change her strategy to decrease her cost to less than 1/β · cost (u, G (s)). A β-approximate GE (β-GE) is defined analogously.
We measure the impact of selfishness on the quality of the created networks via the Price of Anarchy [35] , which for our model is the maximum over the social cost ratios of any NE network and its corresponding social optimum network OPT.
Model Variants. Besides the GNCG, where the game is played on a complete host graph H with arbitrary non-negative edge weights, we also consider several interesting special cases (see Fig. 1 ). In the metric GNCG (M-GNCG) the edge weights of H satisfy the triangle inequality. Besides the general metric version, we consider three versions where the edge weights of H are defined by specific metrics. In the simplest case, the 1-2-GNCG, the edge weights of H are restricted to the set {1, 2}. We also consider the variant where the metric edge weights of H are derived from the shortest path distances in a given weighted tree, the T-GNCG. Note that if distances are derived from shortest path distances in a given weighted graph, then this is equivalent to the M-GNCG. Finally, we consider the R d -GNCG, where the agents are points in R d and the edge weights of H correspond to their p-norm distances. The original NCG [22] where H is an unweighted clique, is the most restricted special case. In the literature a non-metric special case of the GNCG, where the edge weights are restricted to the set {1, ∞} was proposed [19] . We call this variant the 1-∞-GNCG.
Related Work
There is a huge body of literature both on variants of the Network Creation Game and on Network Design Games. We focus on proposed models which share core features of our model and discuss how they are related to our approach. See also Table 1 .
The Network Creation Game (NCG) was proposed by Fabrikant et al. [22] and can be seen as a simplified variant of the connection game by Jackson & Wolinsky [30] . A long line of research, e.g. [2, 4, 5, 14, 20, 22, 39, 42] , has established that the PoA of the NCG is constant for almost all α > 0 and it is widely conjectured that this holds for all α. Fabrikant et al. [22] proved a general upper bound of O( √ α ) and the best known general upper bound as a function of n is o(n ε ), for any ε > 0, and is due to Demaine et al. [20] . It has been shown that computing a best response is NP-hard [22] and that this holds for many variants of the NCG, e.g. [12, 13, [15] [16] [17] 43] . However, also restricted variants with efficient best response computation exist, e.g. [3, 8, 12, 23, 37] . Regarding the dynamic properties, it has been shown [33, 36] that many NCG variants do not have the FIP. Hence, natural convergence protocols like iterated best response dynamics have no convergence guarantee.
A weighted version of the NCG has been proposed by Albers et al. [2] . They consider a version with a specific amount of traffic between each pair of agents but distances are still measured by counting hops. Much closer to our model is the work by Demaine et al. [19] , where a NCG on a general unweighted host graph is introduced. This corresponds to the special case of our model where only the edge weights 1 and ∞ are allowed. The authors prove a general upper bound on the PoA of O( √ α ) and for α ≥ n they show that the PoA is in Ω min √ α/n, n 2 /α and at most min O √ n , n 2 /α which yields a tight non-constant PoA bound
Unfortunately, the proofs in [19] rely on edge weights in {1, ∞} and can therefore not be carried over. However, their lower bound construction yields a lower bound of Ω(
α ) for the GNCG. Also related is the work of Bilò et al. [11] who investigated the max-version of the NCG [20] on a general unweighted host graph.
One of the distinctive features of our model is the non-uniform edge price. A few other models with this feature have been proposed, e.g. [15, 40, 41] , but they all use unit-weight edges. In the model by Cord-Landwehr et al. [18] agents can choose different quality levels of an edge for different prices, i.e., the paid price influences the edge length. With this, the model is incomparable to our approach.
Also related are network formation games where agents simply want to be connected to all other agents, e.g. [8, 25, 34] . Among them, the work by Eidenbenz et al. [21] is closest to us. In their wireline strong connectivity game agents are points in the Euclidian plane who strategically buy incident edges to create a connected network. The edge price equals the length of the edge. This is similar to our model in the Euclidian plane with α = 1 but the focus on connectivity changes the game completely. Another related geometric game was proposed by Moscibroda et al. [45] where agents are points in some metric space and pay a fixed price for each edge. They try to minimize the total stretch. Gulyás et al. [27] considered a network formation game in the hyperbolic plane where agents strive for maximum navigability. This is also a geometric model but drastically different from our approach.
Network Design Games have been proposed in [6, 7] . Their most important feature is that they are potential games [44] , which already shows the contrast to Network Creation Games. Interestingly, Hoefer & Krysta [28] proposed and analyzed a geometric version.
There are many classical optimization problems related to network design, e.g. see the survey by Magnanti & Wong [38] . Many of them are NP-complete, e.g. all the problems labeled "ND" in [24] . Our model is closely related to the Network Design Problem [31] and the Optimum Communication Spanning Tree Problem (ND7 in [24] ). In particular, finding the social optimum network corresponds to a variant of the Network Design Problem, where, instead of having separate budgets for buying edges and for the routing cost, the sum of edge costs and routing costs, i.e., the total distance between all pairs of nodes, is to be minimized. Hence we strongly suspect that computing the social optimum in all versions of our model, with the 1-2-GNCG and the T-GNCG as exceptions, is NP-hard. NE exists (Thm. 3.9)
Dec. NE NP-hard (Thm. 3.7)
Our Contribution
In this paper we investigate the classical Network Creation Game on edge-weighted host graphs. This variant allows modeling the decentralized creation of networks, like fiber-optic communication networks or many variants of overlay networks, by selfish agents, e.g. ISPs. In such settings, the nodes in a network have a physical location and the edge weights and also the cost for creating and maintaining them depend on these locations. In particular, we focus on specific natural metrics, e.g. graph and tree metrics as well as the geometric setting where the agents correspond to points in R d . We show that computing a best response strategy is NP-hard for all variants of our model and we prove for the 1-2-GNCG that deciding if a given strategy profile is in NE is NP-hard as well. The latter is the first result of this type in the realm of NCGs. Moreover, we prove that all our models do not have the finite improvement property. On the positive side, we give an efficient algorithm for computing a social optimum network for the 1-2-GNCG and we show how to trivially obtain the social optimum in the T-GNCG.
Our main focus is a rigorous study of the quality of the induced equilibrium networks of our models. For this we show that NE exist in the 1-2-GNCG and the T-GNCG and that the more general M-GNCG always admits a 3(α + 1)-approximate NE. The main contribution of our paper is a collection of bounds on the Price of Anarchy, i.e. we bound the loss in social welfare due to selfishness and to the lack of central coordination. We prove a tight PoA bound of (α + 2)/2 for the M-GNCG and the T-GNCG. This bound is remarkable, since it is non-constant and much higher than the previously known upper bounds for the NCG or the inherently non-metric 1-∞-GNCG. This shows that allowing weighted edges completely changes the picture. Moreover, in contrast, settling the PoA for the original NCG, which is a special case of all our models, is a major open problem in the field. For the model variant which is closest to the NCG, the 1-2-GNCG, we prove a tight constant bound on the PoA for α ≤ 1 and show that the PoA is in O( √ α ) for α > 1. Hence, this model behaves very similar to the NCG. For the variant with points in R d , the R d -GNCG, with the 1-norm we show how to embed our lower bound construction from the T-GNCG. This yields a tight PoA bound if d tends to infinity. Additionally, for any p-norm with p ≥ 2 we give a lower bound construction which yields PoA of at least 3 for high alpha and which generally shows that the PoA is larger than 1. Finally, for the most general case, the GNCG, we show that the PoA is between (α + 2)/2 and ((α + 2)/2) 2 .
See Table 1 for an overview over the majority of our results and the most relevant results for earlier models (marked with * ). All results on the PoA with an equality sign are tight bounds.
Due to space constraints some details are omitted. These details can be found in the full version [10] .
PRELIMINARIES
We start by clarifying the relation of the models we investigate. Fig. 1 shows which models are special cases of other models. These relationships and the facts that computing a best response strategy is NP-hard for the NCG [22] and that the NCG does not have the FIP [33] directly yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. Computing a best response strategy is NP-hard for the 1-2-GNCG, 1-∞-GNCG, the M-GNCG and the GNCG. Additionally, these models do not have the FIP.
Let
has to pay α · w (u, v) for creating the edge and then her distance to v is guaranteed to be w (u, v). Thus, her total cost for buying the edge (u, v) and reaching node v is
, buying the edge (u, v) is an improving move for agent u.
Now we consider two arbitrary agents u and v in G and let P uv = x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k with u = x 1 and x k = v be a shortest path between u and v in the host graph H . It follows that
Since P uv is a shortest path in H and since any subpath of a shortest path must be a shortest path itself it follows that for all pairs x i and x i+1 , with 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, the equality w (
With a similar technique we get an analogous statement for the social optimum network OPT . Lemma 2.3. The social optimum network is a α 2 + 1 -spanner for any connected host graph H .
HOST GRAPHS WITH METRIC WEIGHTS
In this section we investigate the NCG on complete host graphs with edge weights which satisfy the triangle inequality. After giving some general results, we focus on specific natural metrics. Theorem 3.1. The PoA in the M-GNCG is at most α +2 2 . Proof. Let G be a NE and let u and v be two distinct vertices. Let x and x * be two Boolean variables such that x = 1 if and only if (u, v) is an edge of G and x * = 1 if and only if (u, v) is an edge of the social optimum OPT . We prove the claim by showing that
Essentially σ is the ratio of the social cost contribution of every pair of nodes in the NE and in OPT. If the ratio for every pair of nodes is bounded by (α + 2)/2 then this also holds for their sum. Now we prove the claim. If
Analogously for agent v we get
By summing up the inequalities (1) and (2), we obtain
Therefore, also the last case yields σ ≤ (α + 2)/2.
Existence. It is an interesting open question if NE always exist for the M-GNCG.
Here we prove a weaker result which essentially states that for low α there always is an outcome of the game where no agent can improve by a high multiplicative factor. This yields that there always is a network which is approximately stable. Theorem 3.2. Any AE network in the M-GNCG is in (α + 1)-GE. Now, we adapt the technique from [37] to relate GE and β-NE.
Theorem 3.3. In the M-GNCG every network in GE is in 3-NE.
By Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, we get the following: Corollary 3.4. Every network which is in AE in the M-GNCG is in 3(α + 1)-NE.
1-2-Graphs
Here we consider the M-GNCG for the special case where for every pair of nodes u and v we have either w (u, v) = 1 or w (u, v) = 2. We call an edge of weight 1 or 2 a 1-edge or 2-edge, respectively. We call such graphs 1-2-graphs.
Studying 1-2-graphs is especially interesting since this class of host graphs is the simplest generalization of the unweighted host graphs from the NCG and the edge weights are guaranteed to satisfy the triangle inequality. 1-2-graphs are commonly used as the simplest non-trivial metric special case, e.g. when studying the TSP [1, 9, 32] , and hence they are a natural starting point. We start with a simple statement about 1-edges. We show that for α < 1 any NE must contain all the 1-edges from the host graph. If α = 1, then there always exists a NE which contains all 1-edges. Lemma 3.5. For α = 1 in any NE network in the 1-2-GNCG buying any additional 1-edge is cost neutral for the buyer. For α < 1 buying any 1-edge is an improving move for the buyer.
Hardness. Here we discuss the hardness of deciding if a given strategy profile is in NE for the 1-2-GNCG. Note that the NPhardness of computing a best response strategy for some agent, which is guaranteed by Corollary 2.1, does not directly imply the NP-hardness of the NE decision problem.
First, we take a detour via the Vertex Cover problem. A vertex cover of an undirected graph G is a subset C of vertices of G such that, for every edge (u, v) of G, u ∈ C or v ∈ C. It is well-known that computing a minimum vertex cover of a subcubic graph is NP-hard. We start with a result which may be folklore. Lemma 3.6. Unless P=NP, there is no polynomial time oracle that, given a graph G and a vertex cover of G of size k, decides whether G admits a vertex cover of size at most k − 1.
Theorem 3.7. Unless P=NP, there is no polynomial time algorithm that decides whether a strategy profile is in NE for the 1-2-GNCG.
Proof. The reduction is from the Vertex Cover problem and α = 1. More precisely, we define both a 1-2-graph and a strategy profile such that every agent but one is playing her best response and computing a best response of the remaining agent is equivalent to computing a minimum vertex cover.
We define the graph G = (V , E) such that there is one vertex node a i ∈ V for each vertex v i of the Vertex Cover instance, and two edge nodes p j and p ′ j in V for each edge e j of the Vertex Cover instance. Finally, there is a new node u, that is neither a vertex node nor an edge node. There is an edge of weight 1 between vertex node a i and each edge node p j , p ′ j if and only if v i is an endvertex of e j . Furthermore, there is an edge of weight 1 between every pair of vertex nodes. All the other edges have weight 2.
Consider the strategy profile in which each edge of weight 1 is bought by any of the two agents that are incident to the edge, while u is buying all the edges towards vertex nodes that correspond to a vertex cover of size k w.r.t. the Vertex Cover instance computed using any polynomial time algorithm. Note that by Lemma 3.5 and since α = 1, buying a 1-edge is neutral for the incident agents.
First of all, we observe that the eccentricity of each node is at most 3. Therefore, every agent other than u is actually playing a best response. We claim that for any improving move of u, there exists another improving move in which agent u buys only the edges towards the vertex nodes that correspond to a vertex cover of size at most k − 1 w.r.t. the Vertex Cover instance. The claim then would follow from Lemma 3.6.
Consider any improving move S u for u. We prove the claim by first showing the existence of an alternative improving move consisting only of edges towards vertex nodes. Indeed, if u bought an edge towards an edge node in S u , w.l.o.g. say p j , then u would not buy the edge towards any vertex node a i such that v i is an endvertex of e j . This is simply because the edge (v, p j ) would only affect the distance between u and p j . Moreover, either p ′ j would be at distance 4 from u or u would have also bought the edge towards p ′ j . In either case, u would have convenience in deleting the edge towards p j -as well as the edge towards p ′ j , if she has bought itand in buying the edge towards a vertex node a i , with v i being an endvertex of e j , thus, decreasing her overall cost by at least 1. Now we show that for any improving move S u in which u buys only edges towards vertex nodes, there is another improving move in which u buys only edges towards vertex nodes that correspond to a vertex cover of the Vertex Cover instance. Indeed, if this is not the case, there exist two nodes, say p j and p ′ j , which are at distance 4 from u. Let a i be a vertex node such that v i is an endvertex of e j . Clearly, the distance from u to a i is 3. Thus, by buying the edge towards a i the cost of u would decrease by at least 1.
As a consequence, we can restrict the strategy space for agent u only to improving moves that correspond to vertex covers of the Vertex Cover instance. Let k ′ be the number of edges bought by u in any strategy of the restricted strategy space for u, and let N and m be the number of vertices and edges of the Vertex Cover instance, respectively, The cost of u is equal to 2k ′ + 2k ′ + 3(N − k ′ ) + 6m = 3N + 6m + k ′ . Since N and m are fixed, we observe that the cost of u is minimized when k ′ is minimized. Hence, any improving move for u would define a vertex cover of size of at most k − 1.
3.1.1 1-2-Graphs for α ≤ 1. Here we study the 1-2-GNCG with α ≤ 1. We prove that in this case a NE network always exists. In contrast to the corresponding result for the original NCG [22] we do not prove this via a generic construction. Moreover, we provide a simple algorithm which computes a social optimum network in polynomial time and we provide tight bounds on the PoA.
Existence. In the following we prove an interesting connection between existence of a NE for the 1-2-GNCG with α ≤ 1 and kspanners. The weight of a k-spanner is the total sum of its edge weights. The following results are inspired by Lemma 2.3. Lemma 3.8. Let α ∈ [ 1 2 , 1] and let G be a 3 2 -spanner of minimum weight. Then G contains all the 1-edges of H and has a diameter of at most 3.
Theorem 3.9. Let α ∈ [ 1 2 , 1] and let G be a 3 2 -spanner of minimal weight. There is an edge ownership assignment such that G is in NE.
Proof. The claim is proved by contradiction. Consider any edge ownership assignment in G which induces strategy profile s and assume there is an agent u ∈ V who can improve on her strategy S u in s. We will show that if there is a better strategy S ′ u for agent u, then |S ′ u | ≤ |S u | − 1 and that S ′ u contains strictly less 2-edges than S u . Then we prove that for any edge (u, v), which would be removed by agent u in the strategy change from S u to S ′ u , we can exchange the ownership of its endpoint such that the new owner v cannot improve on her strategy, or we can apply a combination of the two strategies S ′ u and S ′ v to G which yields a new graph which is a 3/2-spanner with less total weight, which contradicts that G is a 3/2-spanner of minimum weight. Therefore, the edge ownership can be chosen such that graph G is in NE.
First, we prove that |S ′ u | ≤ |S u | − 1 and that S ′ u contains less 2-edges than S u . Towards this we claim that the change from S u to S ′ u can only consist of a change of the 2-edges which are bought by u and, if α = 1, possibly the removal of some 1-edges. This is true since by Lemma 3.8 we have that all 1-edges are contained in G and by Lemma 3.5 removing any 1-edge is not an improving move, in particular, removing a 1-edge is a cost neutral move if α = 1.
Using the latter, we can define a new strategy S ′′ u which is identical to S ′ u but still has all the 1-edges which are contained in S u . Thus, S ′′ u \ S ′ u only consists of 1-edges which are cost neutral for agent u under strategy S ′ u . Hence, cost (u, S ′′ u ) = cost (u, S ′ u ) and we have |S ′′ u | ≥ |S ′ u |. Let S u+ = {v ∈ V : v ∈ S ′′ u \ S u } be the set of nodes to which new edges have been added, S u− = {v ∈ V : v ∈ S u \ S ′′ u } be the set of nodes to which the edges have been deleted and let G ′′ be the graph obtained from G by exchanging agent u's strategy S u with S ′′ u . Since the diameter of G is 3, then, after changing the strategy from S u to S ′′ u , only distances between u and nodes at hop-distance 2 from u might increase. Thus, if there is a node
Let G ′ be the graph obtained from G by exchanging agent u's strategy S u with strategy S ′ u . Since the number of edges in G ′ is strictly less than the number of edges in G and since G ′ has strictly less 2-edges than G, it follows that if the diameter of G ′ is 3, then G ′ is a 3/2-spanner of total weight less than the total weight of G and we get a contradiction. But it might happen that there are at least two nodes x, y ∈ V at distance 4 in G ′ . Note that if the distance between x and y increased because of removing the edge
was a 1-edge, then the distance between u and y as well as the distance between u and v would increase by 1. Therefore, the 1-edge (u, v) would not a neutral edge and its removing is not an improving move, i.e., v ∈ S ′ u . Hence, any edge whose deletion influences the distance between not only its endpoints must be a 2-edge. Since for any v ∈ V we have d G ′′ (u, v) ≤ 3 and since G ′′ and G ′ only differ in 1-edges bought by agent u whose removal increases the distance only to the other endpoint, it follows that for any v ∈ V we have d G ′ (u, v) ≤ 3. Since the diameter of G is 3 and since for any v ∈ V we have d G ′ (u, v) ≤ 3, then x must be a neighbor of u which is connected by a 1-edge and y ∈ S u \ S ′ u . For each such edge (u, y) we can invert the ownership and, if none of the new owners has an improving strategy which does not contain u then agent u has a strategy she cannot improve on. Now we prove that after the inversion of the edge ownership for each edge (u, y), for all y ∈ S u \ S ′ u , no agent y can have an improving strategy which does not contain u. Assume towards a contradiction that U is the non-empty set of nodes y, which have an improving strategy S ′ y which does not contain u. We apply all improving strategies S ′ y , for all y ∈ U , and S ′ u to G and obtain a new graph G * . Note that if there are two nodes x, y such that there is a 2-edge (x, y) ∈ E (G), the edge can be removed by one of the endpoints, say x. This move does not influence the strategy of the agent y, since otherwise there must be a node v ∈ V , which is at distance 1 from x and d G (y, v) = w (y, x ) +w (x, v) = 3, and then we could assign the ownership of (x, y) to agent y and then the edge (x, y) would not be removed from G. Therefore, all the strategies can intersect only in pairs of nodes that want to add the same edge.
Note that for any y ∈ U we have S y+ ∩ S u+ = ∅ and S y− ∩ S u− = {(u, y)}, and for all v ∈ V we have d
The number of edges in G is |E (G)| = Ẽ ∪ y ∈U S y− ∪ S u− = |Ẽ| + y ∈U |S y− | + |S u− | − |U |, whereẼ ⊂ E (G) is a set of edges which are both in G and in G * . On the other hand,
Since only 2-edges were modified, the new graph G * is a 3/2-spanner with less weight than the spanner G, which contradicts that G is a 3/2-spanner with minimum weight. Therefore, the edge ownership can be chosen such that the graph G is in NE.
Optimal networks. Now we consider how to compute a social optimum network.
Algorithm 1: computes a social optimum for the 1-2-GNCG.
1 input A complete graph G = K n ; 2 while there is 1-1-2 triangle in G do 3 Remove the edge of weight 2 from the triangle; Theorem 3.10. For any α ≤ 1, algorithm 1 produces an optimal network in polynomial time.
Price of Anarchy. We start with the following technical lemma observing a relation between stable networks and the corresponding optimum.
Lemma 3.11. Consider 0 < α ≤ 1. Let G * be the social optimum obtained by Algorithm 1 and let G be a stable network. Then
We proceed with a lower bound on the PoA which matches the upper bounds given in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.12.
Theorem 3.13. For every constant ϵ > 0,
Now we show that selfishness does not lead to a loss in social welfare if α is small enough. Theorem 3.14. For any 0 ≤ α < 1 2 the PoA is equal to 1. 3.1.2 1-2-Graphs for α > 1. In this section we show that the 1-2-GNCG for α > 1 behaves very similar to the original NCG. We use the proof technique from [22] to show that the PoA may be bounded by the same value as in the original proof. We start with the bounding the social cost of the NE. We are convinced that also other proof techniques from the NCG can be carried over to the 1-2-GNCG. Thus, the PoA should be constant for almost all α and in o(n ε ) for the remaining range.
Tree Metrics
This section is devoted to the study of tree metrics. We assume that the host graph H = (V , E) is defined as the metric closure of an edge-weighted tree T . 2 Existence. The first result is about the structure of any NE. Differently for general metrics and 1-2-graphs, we prove that any NE in T-GNCG is as much sparse as possible.
Theorem 3.18. In the T-GNCG any NE is a tree.
The next result follows by observing that the tree T that defines the metric is the network with cheapest total edge cost that preserves all the distances of the host graph at the same time.
Corollary 3.19. In the T-GNCG the tree T which defines the metric is both the social optimum and in NE.
Corollary 3.19 yields that the cheapest NE is also a social optimum. 3 Hardness. We prove that the problem of computing the best response of a player is NP-hard for tree metrics (T-GNCG). Dynamic Properties. The following theorem shows that the network dynamics consisting of best responses only may never converge to a NE for T-GNCG and thus also for M-GNCG. Theorem 3.21. The T-GNCG is not a potential game.
Price of Anarchy. We prove that the upper bound given in Theorem 3.1 for more general metric instances is tight for tree metrics and thus also for graph metrics. Theorem 3.22. The PoA in the T-GNCG is at least α +2 2 − ε, for any ε > 0.
Proof. Let S * n be the weighted tree which defines the metric distances. The tree S * n is a star and contains n − 2 edges of weight 2/α and one edge (u, v) of weight 1, where u is the center of the star. See Fig. 2 (left) . The star S * n minimizes the social cost, which is
Let S n be a spanning star of the host graph such that a center of S n is the vertex v. The star S n contains one edge of weight 1 and (n − 2) edges of weight (1 + 2/α ). Moreover, we assume that the central vertex v is an owner of all edges in S n . See Fig. 2 (right) . 2 More precisely, w (u, v ) = d T (u, v ) for every two vertices u and v. 3 In Algorithmic Game Theory, this is equivalent to say that the Price of Stability -the ratio between the cost of the cheapest NE and the cost of a social optimum -is 1. We claim that S n is in NE. Indeed, the central agent v cannot improve her strategy because all other vertices are leaves. No leaf owns an edge and, therefore, a leaf agent can possibly improve her strategy only by adding edges to other leaves. For any leaf agent x u buying the edge (x, u) costs α ·2/α = 2 and improves her distances only towards u by 2 + 2/α − 2/α = 2. Hence, buying (x, u) is not an improvement. Buying any other edge costs α · 4/α = 4 for agent x and improves her distance only to the endpoint of the new edge by 2 + 4/α − 4/α = 2. At the same time, the agent u cannot improve her strategy by buying edges to the leafs because it improves distance to each v i by 2 and increases edge cost by the same value for each new edge. Hence, no agent has an improving strategy change and it follows that S n is in NE. The social cost of S n is cost (
Then, for sufficiently large n, the ratio between he social costs of the NE network S n and the optimum S * n is α +2 2 − ε.
Points in R d
In this section we consider the M-GNCG with the assumption that all nodes are points in R d and that distances are measured via the p-norm, i.e., for any two points u = (u 1 , . . . ,
the weight of the corresponding edge between them is defined as
Further, we omit the subscript p if its value does not play any role.
Hardness. We start with investigating the hardness of computing the best response of an agent in the R d -GNCG. We are convinced that the above best response cycle can be adapted to arbitrary p-norms. Price of Anarchy. From Theorem 3.1 it follows that in the R d -GNCG the PoA is at most α +2 2 . It turns out that settling the PoA for the R d -GNCG is a challenging problem. We prove some first steps in this direction and show that the PoA approaches the upper bound for the 1-norm if the number of dimensions grows.
We start with a lower bound which is strictly larger than 1 for the PoA in case of an arbitrary p-norm and independent of number of nodes n and dimension d. For a small number of players the lower bound for the PoA can be improved, which is shown in the next lemma.
Theorem 3.27. The PoA of the R d -GNCG under any p-norm with p ≥ 1 is at least (3α 3 + 24α 2 + 40α + 24)/(α 3 + 10α 2 + 32α + 24).
In contrast to other p-norms, where p ≥ 2, the 1-norm allows us to embed a reduced version of our lower bound construction from the T-GNCG. With increasing number of dimensions we can embed more and more of our construction. The following lemma shows that for arbitrary large d the lower bound of the PoA approaches the upper bound of α +2 2 . Theorem 3.28. In a 1-norm d-dimensional space the PoA is at least 1 + α/(2 + α/(2d − 1)). The only case we have to prove is when w (u, v) > d H (u, v), x = 1, and x * = 0 as the proof for all the other cases is identical to the proof of Theorem 3.1 for M-GNCG, where σ ≤ α +2 2 . We prove the claim by showing that w (u, v)
GENERAL WEIGHTED HOST GRAPHS
The proof is by contradiction. W.l.o.g., we assume that u is the owner of the edge (u, v). Let P be a shortest path between u and v in H . Since w (u, v) > d H (u, v), P contains two or more edges. Furthermore, some edges of P are missing from G, as otherwise player u would remove the edge (u, v) without increasing the distance towards v and thus improving on her cost function. Let k be the number of edges of P that are not in G. We consider the edges of P in order from u to v and we denote by (x i , y i ) the i-th edge of P that is not in G. We observe that x 1 might be equal to u.
First, we prove that d G (u, y i ) ≤ d G (u, x i ) + α +2 2 w (x i , y i ), for every i = 1, . . . , k. We divide the proof into two cases, according to whether x i = u or not.
We consider the case in which x i u. We observe that this case definitely occurs if i > 1. The proof is by contradiction. For the sake of contradiction, we assume that d G (u, y i ) > d G (u, x i ) + α +2
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed the well-known Network Creation Game on weighted complete host graphs. We think this is a significant step towards a more realistic game-theoretic model for the decentralized creation of networks, like fiber-optic or overlay networks. We showed that the weighted version of these games behaves similarly to the unit-weight NCG in terms of the hardness of computing a best response and in its dynamic properties. However, the Price of Anarchy is radically different. Whereas in the original NCG the PoA is conjectured to be constant and actually proven to be constant for almost all α, we have shown that the PoA, even for the restricted metric case of the T-GNCG, is linear in α. Since α is a parameter for adjusting the trade-off between edge cost and distance cost, this implies that for settings where the edge cost dominates, i.e. α is high, coordination is needed to guarantee socially efficient outcomes.
For understanding the impact of coordination, the next step should be to analyze the Price of Stability, i.e. the social cost ratio of the best equilibrium network and the social optimum. Another challenging task is to prove or refute that pure Nash equilibria always exist and to find a way to guide the agents to stable states with preferably low social cost. Besides this, naturally our conjectures, most prominently Conjecture 4.2, call for further investigation.
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